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“TWO PARTS OF THE LANDSCAPE OF FAMILY 
IN AMERICA”:  MAINTAINING BOTH SPOUSAL 
AND DOMESTIC PARTNER EMPLOYEE 
BENEFITS FOR BOTH SAME-SEX AND 
DIFFERENT-SEX COUPLES 
Nancy D. Polikoff* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, by administrative regulation, Arizona extended health benefits 
to the domestic partners of state employees.1  The criteria included living 
together for at least a year and demonstrated financial interdependence.2  
Same-sex and different-sex partners were eligible.3  Keith Humphrey, a 
University of Arizona administrator, enrolled his partner of six years, Brett, 
a stay-at-home dad to the couple’s two foster children and Brett’s fifteen-
year-old son.4  Tracy Collins, a senior highway patrol officer, enrolled her 
partner of nine years, Diana, whose debilitating disease early in their 
relationship had precipitated Tracy filing for bankruptcy.5  Beverly 
Seckinger, a University of Arizona professor, enrolled her partner of twenty 
years, Susan, a freelance website designer with primary responsibility for 
the care of her eighty-nine-year-old mother and a history of life-threatening 
asthma attacks.6 
 
*  Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law; 2011–12 
McDonald/Wright Visiting Chair of Law, UCLA School of Law and Faculty Chair of the 
Williams Institute.  This essay is dedicated to the memory of Paula Ettelbrick (1955–2011), 
whose expansive vision of family animated her 25 years of activism, advocacy, and litigation 
on behalf of LGBT individuals and families.  Paula would have read a draft of this Article 
and offered suggestions to improve it.  I miss her counsel and her friendship.  The quotation 
in the title is from Press Release, Nat’l Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Joint Statement in 
Favor of Maintaining Domestic Partner Benefits (June 20, 2004), available at 
http://thetaskforce.org/press/releases/pr705_063004.  For further discussion, see infra Part 
III.C. 
 1. Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 2. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-6-101(19)(b),(k) (2012). 
 3. See id. 
 4. Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 15, Collins v. Brewer, 
727 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. CV09-2402-PHX-JWS). 
 5. Id. at 13–14. 
 6. Id. at 19–21. 
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In September 2009, Arizona governor Jan Brewer signed legislation 
eliminating the benefits by limiting eligibility to spouses.7  Before the 
rescission could take effect, Lambda Legal, the nation’s largest LGBT 
rights legal organization, challenged the constitutionality of the legislation 
on behalf of state employees with same-sex partners, including Keith, 
Tracy, and Beverly.8  Lambda won a preliminary injunction against the 
rescission of benefits in the district court under the name Collins v. 
Brewer,9 which the Ninth Circuit affirmed last year under the name Diaz v. 
Brewer.10  After the Ninth Circuit denied the State’s petition to hear the 
case en banc,11 Arizona filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. 
Supreme Court,12 which will decide this fall whether to review the case. 
But wait. 
Let me start over, and begin this narrative at a different point in time and 
with a less selective set of facts. 
In 2006, an Arizona referendum that would have barred both same-sex 
marriage and any legal recognition of unmarried partners, gay or straight, 
failed at the polls.13  Prop. 107, as it was known, is the only ballot measure 
against same-sex marriage that has ever been defeated.14  The text of the 
initiative read: 
To preserve and protect marriage in this state, only a union between one 
man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage by this 
state or its political subdivisions and no legal status for unmarried persons 
 
 7. See Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011).  For a strong opinion piece 
against passage of the legislation, see Barbara A. Atwood, Preserve Domestic Partner 
Benefits, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Feb. 3, 2009, available at http://www.law.arizona.edu/news/
Press/2009/Atwood020309.pdf. 
 8. Diaz, 656 F.3d at 1010–11. 
 9. 727 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
 10. 656 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011).  To avoid confusion, I refer to this litigation as 
Diaz in the body of this Article, even though the arguments and opinion at the district court 
level, and the briefs filed at the Ninth Circuit, came under the case’s previous name of 
Collins v. Brewer. 
 11. 676 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 12. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Brewer v. Diaz, No. 12-23 (U.S. July 2, 
2012). 
 13. Christina Borrego, Staying on Message Brought Arizona Together, EQUALITYNY 
(Feb. 17, 2007), http://www.equalityny.com/site/index.php?option=com_bookmarks&task=
detail&id=431. 
 14. Nate Silver, The Future of Same-Sex Marriage Ballot Measures, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT 
(June 29, 2011, 10:35 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/the-future-
of-same-sex-marriage-ballot-measures/ (predicting the future of same-sex marriage ballot 
measures using the “results of 34 ballot initiatives to limit same-sex marriage rights, all but 
one of which, Arizona Proposition 107, were approved”).  Four ballot measures will be 
decided in 2012.  Voters in Washington and Maryland will decide whether to affirm or reject 
marriage equality bills passed by their state legislatures.  Maine will become the first state in 
which voters decide whether to proactively pass marriage equality.  Minnesotans will vote 
on a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage. 2012:  The Year of Marriage, 
HRC BLOG, http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/2012-the-year-of-marriage (last visited Oct. 20, 
2012).  After these votes, Prop. 107 may well no longer be the only ballot initiative against 
same-sex marriage that has ever been defeated. 
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shall be created or recognized by this state or its political subdivisions that 
is similar to that of marriage.15 
The campaign against Prop. 107 prominently featured different-sex couples 
who feared losing domestic partner benefits offered at the time by some 
Arizona municipalities.16 
In fact, the poster couple against Prop. 107, Al and Maxine, were so 
widely known that a story about them appeared in The Washington Post.17  
A lawsuit filed to stop the ballot measure, while ultimately unsuccessful, 
included as plaintiffs two Phoenix firefighters who feared losing domestic 
partner benefits for their different-sex domestic partners.18  The message of 
the campaign against the initiative explicitly focused on the health care 
benefits that domestic partners would lose.19 
Returning now to the narrative that began this introduction, in 2008, by 
administrative regulation, Arizona extended health benefits to the domestic 
partners of state employees.  The criteria included living together for at 
least a year and demonstrated financial interdependence.  Same-sex and 
different-sex partners were eligible.  Without question, had Prop. 107 
passed, it would have been unconstitutional to extend such benefits to any 
unmarried partners. 
In September 2009, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer signed legislation 
eliminating the benefits by limiting eligibility to spouses.20  Before the 
rescission could take effect, Lambda Legal challenged the constitutionality 
of the legislation, but only on behalf of those state employees with same-
sex partners.21 
So Keith, Tracy, Beverly, and their fellow plaintiffs had domestic partner 
health benefits in the first place only because of a coalition effort that 
depended on different-sex domestic partners, but Lambda, on their behalf, 
abandoned, and indeed trivialized, that constituency when it came time for 
litigation.  This Essay examines that choice and asserts that it was a 
mistake. 
 
 15. 2006 Ballot Propositions & Judicial Performance Review, ARIZ. DEP’T ST. 
(Sept. 2006), http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/info/pubpamphlet/english/prop107.htm 
(emphasis added). 
 16. Amanda J. Crawford, Consistent Message Doomed Prop 107; Loss of Benefits to 
Unwed Pairs Loomed Large, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 9, 2006, at 21; see also Borrego, supra 
note 13. 
 17. Sonya Geis, New Tactic in Fighting Marriage Initiatives:  Opponents Cite Effects on 
Straight Couples, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2006, at A3. 
 18. Press Release, Ariz. Together, Couples Protected by Domestic Partner Benefits File 
a Lawsuit Against “Protect Marriage Arizona,” (July 12, 2006), available at 
http://www2.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=109&STORY=/www/story/07-12-
2006/0004396019&EDATE= (describing Phoenix firefighters Paul Knobbe and Glen 
Cromer who stood to lose benefits for their different-sex domestic partners).  The lawsuit 
was unsuccessful. See Ariz. Together v. Brewer, 149 P.3d 742, 750–51 (Ariz. 2007). 
 19. See KYRSTEN SINEMA, UNITE AND CONQUER:  HOW TO BUILD COALITIONS THAT 
WIN—AND LAST 59 (2009). 
 20. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 38-651(O) (2011). 
 21. See infra Part II.A. 
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In Part I, I briefly describe the history and importance of domestic 
partner employee benefits, documenting both original and contemporary 
practices extending eligibility to same-sex and different-sex partners.  In 
Part II, I describe Lambda’s arguments in Diaz and contrast them to its 
approach ten years earlier in Irizarry v. Board of Education of the City of 
Chicago,22 where Lambda argued not only in favor of benefits for 
unmarried heterosexual partners but for the unconstitutionality of excluding 
such couples from benefits.  I also place the approach in Irizarry in the 
context of other advocacy, including the numerous LGBT organizations 
that ten years before Irizarry participated in Braschi v. Stahl Associates.23 
In Part III, I describe recent examples of gay rights groups eliminating or 
minimizing their support for unmarried couples who have the option to 
marry.  In recent litigation in New York, a female employee challenged the 
denial of benefits for her male domestic partner when similarly situated 
same-sex partners were receiving those benefits.  I consider it a missed 
opportunity that neither Lambda nor any other LGBT organization weighed 
in on behalf of the plaintiff in that case.  I also illustrate two instances of 
overtly backing away from unequivocal support for unmarried couples.  In 
one, Lambda framed a case that was squarely about unlawful marital status 
discrimination as instead a case that illustrates the harm of denying access 
to marriage.  The other involves comparing 2004 and 2011 public 
statements opposing elimination of domestic partner benefits even when 
same-sex couples can marry.  The 2004 statement explicitly supports 
diverse family structures, while the more recent one offers only 
instrumental justifications for not requiring same-sex couples to marry.  In 
conclusion, I suggest how and why unmarried same-sex couples in marriage 
equality states, and therefore unmarried heterosexual couples everywhere, 
must remain on the agenda of gay rights groups. 
I.  DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS THEN AND NOW 
The first domestic partner benefits were offered in 1982 by the Village 
Voice.24  In 1985, Berkeley became the first public employer to offer such 
benefits.25  Eligibility for coverage extended to both same-sex and 
different-sex couples, as did all such eligibility throughout the 1980s.26  
Advocates and employers alike did not distinguish between those who 
could not marry and those who chose not to marry.27  Domestic partner 
 
 22. See 251 F.3d 604, 611 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 23. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). 
 24. NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE:  VALUING ALL 
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 49 (2008).  For a history of domestic partner benefits in the 1980s, 
see id. at 49–51. 
 25. Id. at 50.  West Hollywood instituted a domestic partnership registry in 1985, but 
health insurance benefits did not become available until 1989. Ron Russell, W. Hollywood 
Will Insure Partners of Single Employees, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1989, at B3. 
 26. POLIKOFF, supra note 24, at 49. 
 27. Id. 
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benefits consciously reflected the numerous changes in the previous two 
decades that made marriage matter less, both legally and culturally.28 
The first domestic partner benefits only for same-sex couples emerged in 
1991, and they were explicitly not about diminishing the significance of 
marriage.29  Rather, they were framed as an equity issue for same-sex 
couples who could not marry.  This turned what had previously been a 
reform in the name of deprivileging marriage into an issue of gay rights, 
based on formal equality between married heterosexual couples and gay and 
lesbian couples who were denied access to marriage.30 
This shift in focus and framing has had an enormous impact, but it has 
not entirely supplanted the original impetus for domestic partner benefits.  
Most employers who provide such benefits cover both same-sex and 
different-sex couples.  In the most comprehensive assessment available, a 
2011 report from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics found that roughly 30 
percent of U.S. workers have access to health care benefits for same-sex 
domestic partners; 25 percent have such benefits for their different-sex 
unmarried partners.31  Of especial relevance to Lambda’s approach in Diaz, 
almost all public employers who extend benefits to same-sex partners also 
offer them to unmarried different-sex partners.32  The Human Rights 
Campaign Foundation (HRC), which rates private employers through its 
Corporate Equality Index (CEI), has found that 64 percent of employers 
who have same-sex domestic partner benefits also cover unmarried 
different-sex partners.33  In 2007, a Hewitt Associates survey found a 
similar percentage.34 
 
 28. These included widespread acceptance of sex outside marriage, easing the legal 
distinction between marital and nonmarital children, inscribing a norm of equality between 
men and women that lessened the dependence of women upon husbands, and instituting no-
fault divorce. Id. at 23–33. 
 29. See id. at 61. 
 30. Id. 
 31. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits in the United States—
March 2011 (July 26, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebnr0017.pdf.  For a 
description of the breakdown by, among other things, type of employer, job category, and 
geographical location, see Nancy Polikoff, New Government Report Tells Us How Many 
Employees Can Include Same and Different-Sex Domestic Partners on Their Health 
Benefits, BEYOND (STRAIGHT & GAY) MARRIAGE BLOG (July 27, 2011, 9:38 PM), 
http://beyondstraightandgaymarriage.blogspot.com/2011/07/new-government-report-tells-us-
how-many.html. 
 32. Paul Richter, Partner Benefits:  Just What is Equality?, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 27, 2009, at 
A32 (citing Ilse de Veer of the consulting group Mercer).  Mercer releases annually a 
publication entitled National Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Plans. See, e.g., 
Employers Accelerate Efforts to Bring Health Benefit Costs Under Control, MERCER (Nov. 
16, 2011), http://www.mercer.com/press-releases/national-survey-employer-sponsored-
health-plans. 
 33. Email from Deena Fidas, Deputy Dir., Corp. Programs, Workplace Project, Human 
Rights Campaign Found., to author (May 16, 2012, 3:19 PM) (on file with author). 
 34. Thirty-two percent of surveyed firms offered benefits to both same and different-sex 
couples; 17 percent offered benefits to same sex only. EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., 
FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 400 (6th ed. 2009). 
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Unions support benefit plans that go beyond same-sex couples.  In 1992, 
AFSCME endorsed domestic partnership benefits, asserting that 
“[e]mployers should not have the right to discriminate on the basis of 
marital status.”35  In 1991, the AFL-CIO passed a resolution in support of 
extending benefits to “all persons living together in a household as a 
family.”36  In 2008, SEIU adopted a resolution entitled “Valuing All 
Families” that opposes limiting the definition of family to legally married 
adults and states, in part, “Government and employer-provided benefits 
should support individuals with day-to-day responsibilities to care for and 
financially support minor children and dependent adults in all family forms, 
and should protect interdependent adult relationships.”37  At a 2008 hearing 
on extending domestic partner benefits to same-sex partners of federal 
employees, Maine Senator Susan Collins gave opening remarks suggesting 
the benefits should extend to heterosexual couples as well, and NTEU 
national president Colleen Kelley departed from her written testimony to 
support the expansion suggested by Senator Collins.38 
Given the prevalence of more inclusive partner benefits and the 
opportunity to work in coalition with other organizations to obtain and 
preserve such benefits, it is disturbing that the formula HRC uses in its CEI 
considers only same-sex partner benefits and does not penalize an employer 
that fails to extend benefits to unmarried different-sex partners.39  Indeed, 
HRC also takes the position that when an employer’s entire workforce is 
within a state that allows same-sex marriage, the CEI will not penalize the 
employer for eliminating partner benefits and requiring all employees to 
marry.40 
Coupling HRC’s rating criteria with Lambda Legal’s abandonment of 
unmarried different-sex partners, even when that constituency—as in 
Arizona—made benefits for same-sex couples possible, the nation’s largest 
gay rights advocacy organization and the nation’s largest gay rights legal 
organization appear to have written off their agenda the needs of same-sex 
couples who can marry but choose not to. 
I hope they will reconsider. 
 
 35. Domestic Partner Benefits, AFSCME, http://www.afscme.org/members/
conventions/resolutions-and-amendments/1992/resolutions/101-domestic-partner-benefits 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
 36. Brandy Davis, In Defense of Equality:  Unions Stand Up for LGBT Families, LAB. 
FAM. NEWS (Winter 2009), http://www.working-families.org/publications/newsletter/LPWF
insidestoryWinter09.pdf. 
 37. Nancy Polikoff, SEIU Resolution Values All Families, BEYOND (STRAIGHT & GAY) 
MARRIAGE BLOG (May 27, 2009, 4:55 AM), http://beyondstraightandgaymarriage.
blogspot.com/2009/05/seiu-resolution-values-all-families.html. 
 38. Nancy Polikoff, Hearing Today on Domestic Partner Benefits for Federal 
Government Employees, BEYOND (STRAIGHT & GAY) MARRIAGE BLOG (Sept. 24, 2008, 
10:23 AM), http://beyondstraightandgaymarriage.blogspot.com/2008/09/hearing-today-on-
domestic-partner.html. 
 39. See Email from Deena Fidas, supra note 33. 
 40. Id. 
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II.  THE DIAZ V. BREWER LEGAL THEORIES AND THE PATHS NOT TAKEN 
In the first sentence of the statement of the case in its Ninth Circuit brief, 
Lambda asserted that the Arizona legislation, if allowed to take effect, 
would end the partner health benefit for “only lesbian and gay State 
employees, and not their heterosexual co-workers.”41  Lambda could make 
this patently inaccurate statement because it took the position that 
heterosexual employees had not, in fact, lost their benefits because they 
could access them by marrying their partners. 
Lambda later acknowledged in a footnote that domestic partner benefits 
had been extended to heterosexual employees, but referred to those 
employees as ones who had “chosen not to marry their different-sex 
domestic partner.”42  On the same page, the brief alleged that all the 
plaintiffs would marry their same-sex partners if permitted to by Arizona 
law.43  The brief repeatedly reminded the court that the plaintiffs were not 
challenging the elimination of benefits to unmarried different-sex partners 
and characterized the relief they were seeking as only what their 
heterosexual coworkers already had.44 
The framing of this litigation throws into question the contours of the 
same-sex relationships and families that Lambda envisions as its 
constituency.  One can speculate about the conversation between the 
prospective Arizona plaintiffs and their lawyers at Lambda.  I wonder if the 
lawyers asked in any open-ended way whether the couples involved wanted 
to marry, and whether they offered their services to all gay and lesbian 
employees, even those who did not want to marry.  I wonder if they instead 
simply told prospective clients that they planned to litigate the case on a 
theory that heterosexuals had a path to benefits by marrying and that, 
therefore, those who wished to be plaintiffs would need to say that they, 
too, would marry if permitted to do so. 
In this section I critique Lambda’s approach in Diaz and, by contrast, 
describe its earlier advocacy that either explicitly or implicitly eschewed the 
argument that couples must or would marry if marriage is available. 
A.  The Path Taken:  The Legal Theory of Diaz 
Lambda’s first cause of action in Diaz was an equal protection claim 
alleging a classification based on an employee’s sexual orientation or the 
sex of the employee’s partner.45  This theory required that the plaintiffs 
compare themselves with heterosexual employees and then assert that they 
were “similarly situated in every relevant respect to the heterosexual State 
employees who Defendants permit to qualify their different-sex life partners 
 
 41. Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Response Brief at 2, Collins v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir 
2011) (No. 10-16797), 2010 WL 5813343. 
 42. Id. at 4 n.3. 
 43. Id. at 4. 
 44. See id. at 11, 17, 18, 43, 46–47. 
 45. Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 34–41. 
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and partners’ children for family coverage through marriage.”46  
Obviously, this articulation could not support a claim to block the rescission 
of benefits for unmarried heterosexual partners, and Lambda did have 
reason to consider it a strong legal theory.47 
The theory has been successful in a handful of state court cases, under 
state constitutions.48  In none of the cases, however, did the state eliminate 
domestic partner benefits previously available to all unmarried couples.49  
Rather, in each case, the state extended benefits only to spouses, and the 
gay and lesbian plaintiffs argued the unconstitutionality of assigning 
benefits on a basis unavailable to them.50 
It is extraordinarily unlikely that Lambda would have represented gay 
and lesbian Arizona state employees in such an affirmative lawsuit, seeking 
partner benefits where none existed.  Lambda has not filed suit, for 
 
 46. Id. at 35 (emphasis added). 
 47. Lambda knew this case would go to the Ninth Circuit, which had issued two 
opinions in 2009 supportive of the rights of same-sex couples. See In re Golinski, 587 F.3d 
956 (9th Cir. 2009); Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
 48. See Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781 (Alaska 2005); Snetsinger v. 
Mont. Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445 (Mont. 2004); Bedford v. N.H. Cmty. Technical Coll. Sys., 
No. 04-E-229 (N.H. Super. Ct. 2005), available at http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/
bedford-and-breen-v-new-hampshire-technical-college-system/2006-bedford-decision.pdf; 
Tanner v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).  The ACLU is currently 
litigating a case in Alaska following up on the win cited above.  In Schmidt v. Alaska, No. S-
14521 (Alaska 2012), same-sex couples are challenging their inability to qualify for a 
property tax exemption available to married heterosexual couples. See Schmidt and Schuh v. 
Alaska—Case Profile, ACLU (May 9, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/schmidt-and-
schuh-v-alaska-case-profile. 
 49. I can find only one case in which an LGBT legal organization is representing only 
gay and lesbian employees even though both gay and straight employees lost domestic 
partner benefits.  The ACLU LGBT Rights Project represents plaintiffs in Bassett v. Snyder, 
No. 2:12-cv-10038-DML-MJH (E.D. Mich. filed Jan. 5, 2012), challenging a Michigan 
statute limiting benefits to spouses and family members who can inherit by intestate 
succession.  See MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 15.581–.585 (2012); Bassett et al. v. Snyder, ACLU 
(Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/bassett-et-al-v-snyder.  This statute 
effectively eliminated benefits to “other eligible adults,” a category that encompassed more 
than unmarried partners.  That category had been created by numerous public employers in 
Michigan to get around the Michigan Supreme Court’s ruling that providing benefits 
specifically to unmarried partners violated Michigan’s super-DOMA. See Nat’l Pride at 
Work, Inc. v. Granholm, 748 N.W.2d 524, 543 (Mich. 2008).  The term “super-DOMA” is 
one way to describe state constitutional amendments that ban not only recognition of same-
sex marriage but of all unmarried couples.  Although a full discussion of Bassett, and the 
history of partner benefits in Michigan, is beyond the scope of this Article, I would note that 
the complaint in Bassett does not allege that the employees would marry their partners if 
permitted under Michigan law, nor do the briefs and pleadings claim that only gay 
employees lost benefits as a result of the challenged statute. See, e.g., First Amended 
Complaint, Bassett, No. 2:12-cv-10038-DML-MJH (E.D. Mich. Feb. 17, 2012). 
 50. This theory also lies at the heart of another case being litigated by the ACLU, 
Glossip v. Missouri Department of Transportation, No. 10-CC00434 (Mo. Cir. Ct. filed Dec. 
2, 2010), challenging Missouri for extending survivor benefits to the spouse, but not the 
same-sex partner, of a state trooper killed in the line of duty. See Glossip v. Missouri 
Department of Transportation and Highway Patrol Employees’ Retirement System, 
ACLU (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/glossip-v-missouri-department-
transportation-and-highway-patrol-employees-retirement-sys. 
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example, on behalf of gay and lesbian state employees in Idaho, who lack 
access to benefits because they cannot marry and whose claim would also 
wind up before the Ninth Circuit.51 
Lambda picked Arizona because the employees had the benefits and 
were going to lose them.  This distinct fact allowed Lambda to demonstrate 
that the provision of benefits had been running smoothly52 and also to show 
concrete harm to individuals about to lose those benefits.53  But every 
single Lambda client had benefits only because the defeat of Prop. 107 
allowed a sympathetic governor to institute them.  And Prop. 107 was 
defeated only because images of different-sex domestic partners persuaded 
Arizona voters to reject a super-DOMA.54 
Gay and straight employees with domestic partners were allied in 
Arizona, and Lambda severed that alliance. 
B.  The Path Not Taken:  Comparing Diaz with Irizarry 
Lambda also claimed a violation of the plaintiffs’ substantive due process 
rights,55 alleging that “[e]ach Plaintiff has a protected, fundamental right 
and liberty interest in his or her private intimate conduct and family 
relationship with his or her committed same-sex life partner.”56  Any such 
right extends equally to Arizona state employees with different-sex 
partners.57  The exclusion of such employees from the group of plaintiffs in 
Diaz, therefore, was not a product of an inability to find a legal theory in 
support of their claim. 
 
 51. The Idaho Constitution states that “[a] marriage between a man and a woman is the 
only domestic legal union that shall be valid or recognized in this state.” IDAHO CONST. art. 
III, § 28.  Concerned that affording domestic partner benefits would violate the Idaho 
Constitution, University of Idaho faculty voted earlier this year to support extension of 
benefits to household members who meet certain criteria. Holly Bowen, Faculty OKs 
Health Benefits for Shared Households, MOSCOW-PULLMAN DAILY NEWS (Apr. 25, 2012, 
1:00 AM), http://dnews.com/local/article_7cad630c-52e4-5605-9413-ad263865bbd6.html.  
The university president has yet to approve this plan. 
 52. In support of its motion for a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs submitted a report 
prepared by the state of Arizona on its health benefits plan for 2008–09, the first year 
domestic partner benefits became available.  The plaintiffs quoted the portion of the report 
noting that the state had provided “comprehensive and affordable insurance coverage,” and 
“effectively controlled the rise in health care costs through quality benefit design, 
administrative oversight, strategic audit planning, and efficient contracts management.”  
Collins v. Brewer, 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 811 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
 53. The district court opinion included a finding that “several plaintiffs’ domestic 
partners have medical conditions requiring daily medication and consistent treatment that if 
left untreated will likely lead to irreversible health consequences.” Id. at 812. 
 54. Although Prop. 107 did not pass, in 2008, Arizona enacted a constitutional 
amendment recognizing marriage as only between one man and one woman. See ARIZ. 
CONST. art. 30, § 1. 
 55. Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 41–43. 
 56. Id. at 42. 
 57. For example, in a case litigated by the ACLU, the Arkansas Supreme Court relied on 
such a Due Process ground under the Arkansas Constitution to strike down a ban on foster 
parenting and adoption by unmarried couples. See Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cole, No. 
10-840, 2011 Ark. 145, at *24 (Apr. 7, 2011). 
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Surely among the heterosexual Arizona employees who lost coverage 
there were some with circumstances as compelling and sympathetic as 
those of the gay plaintiffs.  At the district court hearing in Diaz, the judge 
challenged the State’s assertion that it could promote marriage by spending 
scarce dollars on married persons by asking whether that reasoning would 
mean that the State could pay a higher wage to a married woman than an 
unmarried woman in order to favor marriage.58  Arguing on behalf of the 
State, Assistant Attorney General Charles Grube, after some hedging, said, 
“under an appropriate circumstance, I’ll bet they could.”  “Really,” 
commented the judge.  “Yes. Yes,” replied Grube.  “Interesting,” responded 
the judge.59  Had Lambda pursued a claim for all employees, it could have 
used discovery to draw out such constitutionally suspect reasoning.  In 
addition, Lambda could have brought an equal protection claim on behalf of 
the unmarried couples. 
Lambda made a version of such arguments over ten years ago before the 
Seventh Circuit where it argued in Irizarry v. Board of Education of the 
City of Chicago that it was unconstitutional to extend partner benefits to 
same-sex couples without including different-sex unmarried couples as 
well.60  Because the heterosexual Arizona employees had plausible legal 
claims, it is appropriate to consider why Lambda spoke dismissively of 
their choice not to marry and so forcefully distanced the gay and lesbian 
employees from those making that choice.  A closer examination of Irizarry 
can shed some light on the more profound significance of this strategic 
decision. 
In July 1999, the Chicago Board of Education extended spousal health 
benefits to the same-sex domestic partners of its employees.61  Shortly 
thereafter, Milagros Irizarry filed a challenge on equal protection grounds to 
the constitutionality of excluding her different-sex partner of more than 
twenty years from the benefit scheme.62  Although only heterosexual 
employees would have profited from Irizarry’s success, Lambda filed an 
amicus brief in the Seventh Circuit supporting the extension of benefits to 
different-sex domestic partners.63 
In describing its interest as amicus curiae, Lambda asserted that “it is 
unjust to use marriage as the sole trigger for familial employment benefits, 
denying to unmarried families fundamental protections of which they have 
equal need.”64  “In the course of its work,” the brief continued, “Lambda 
has consistently and strongly advised that partner benefit plans should not 
be limited to same-sex couples as a matter of policy and principle, even 
 
 58. Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 41, at 39. 
 59. Id. 
 60. 251 F.3d 604, 608–09 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 61. Id. at 606. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
Inc. in Support of Neither Party and in Support of Reversal, Irizarry v. Bd of Ed. of the City 
of Chi., 251 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2001) (No. 99 C 6991). 
 64. Id. at 1. 
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while recognizing that such limited plans often are passed with the good 
intentions of remedying other, pre-existing discrimination.”65 
Of course, the Board of Education defended its program by asserting that 
heterosexual couples had the option to obtain benefits by marrying.66  
Lambda addressed this defense as follows: 
 For plaintiff, the structural exclusion from benefits on the basis of 
marriage is primarily a matter of whether the state can force her to 
marry—that is, to change her decision about the exercise of a fundamental 
right that is available to her—as a condition of providing equal 
employment compensation and greater health security for her family.  
Lambda is very sympathetic to this dilemma and expects that many 
lesbian and gay citizens may one day share her predicament and be put to 
the same choice.  No one’s family health and security should depend on 
their constitutionally protected choice of whether to marry or not.67 
Lambda criticized the district court’s conclusion that unmarried couples had 
not historically faced “invidious social and political prejudice and 
stereotyped prejudgments,”68 citing 
an evident and unfortunate historical record of civil and criminal 
legislation, legal discrimination and social and political condemnation 
directed at this group of citizens.  They are derisively characterized as 
“living in sin” or “shacking up,” or as selfish and uncommitted to each 
other and their children.  They have been historically penalized in child 
custody cases . . . , left unprotected by property distribution laws, and 
specifically targeted by fornication, cohabitation and sodomy laws from 
which married couples are exempt.69 
Lambda argued that classifying on the basis of such sentiments furthered no 
legitimate government interest.  The brief also presented evidence that 
discrimination against unmarried persons had a disparate racial impact.70 
Irizarry did not prevail.  The Seventh Circuit found the cost of covering 
unmarried heterosexual couples a rational basis for extending benefits only 
to same-sex couples.71  In Diaz, the plaintiffs alleged that only a small 
fraction of those receiving benefits were same-sex partners, as a way of 
countering the State’s alleged interest in cost savings.72 
 
 65. Id. at 2. 
 66. Irizarry, 251 F.3d at 606. 
 67. Brief of Lambda Legal, supra note 63, at 12. 
 68. Id. at 17. 
 69. Id. at 17–18 (citations omitted). See generally CYNTHIA BOWMAN, UNMARRIED 
COUPLES, LAW & PUBLIC POLICY (2010) (providing an extensive review of the history of 
discrimination against unmarried couples). 
 70. Brief of Lambda Legal, supra note 63, at 5 n.4. 
 71. Irizarry, 251 F.3d at 610. 
 72. Economist Lee Badgett provided written testimony estimating that of the 893 
employees covering their domestic partners, only 63 to 298 were likely to be same-sex 
partners.  She estimated that the fractional cost of covering only same-sex partners was 
between 0.06 percent and 0.27 percent of the State’s spending on health benefits. Plaintiffs-
Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 41, at 9–10.  For a discussion of the cost of 
domestic partner benefits, see Domestic Partnership Benefits:  Cost and Utilization, 
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But the cost of covering the domestic partners of both gay and straight 
employees has not deterred most employers from adopting more inclusive 
criteria.  In the years since Irizarry there has been much data on the costs of 
domestic partner benefits for both same-sex and different-sex partners, and 
“[e]xperience has shown that the costs of domestic partner coverage are 
lower than anticipated.”73 
The Diaz complaint actually cited several municipalities in Arizona for 
the claim that “[p]ublic employers in Arizona have confirmed the lack of 
disproportionate costs of domestic partner health coverage, the related cost-
savings, and the positive effects on employee retention and positive 
morale.”74  All the cited municipalities, however—Phoenix, Tempe, 
Scottsdale, and Tucson—extend benefits to different-sex as well as same-
sex partners.  Indeed, it was the threat of losing those very benefits that 
galvanized unmarried heterosexual couples to oppose Prop. 107.75 
It is of course possible that Lambda’s claim on behalf of the heterosexual 
employees would have been unsuccessful, but that cannot fully explain its 
decision to pretend that heterosexual employees had not lost their benefits 
rather than attempt an argument modeled on the one it articulated in 
Irizarry.  For that, an examination of some dicta in Irizarry is necessary. 
The Seventh Circuit did not stop at articulating cost as a rational basis for 
excluding different-sex couples from partner benefits.  Rather, writing for 
the panel, Judge Posner’s opinion was dismissive and derisive of Irizarry’s 
and Lambda’s arguments. 
Posner took special aim at Lambda’s amicus brief, which he called 
“surprising[].”76  He explained Lambda’s involvement as reflecting its 
concern that state and national policy encourages marriage.  “Lambda wants 
to knock marriage off its perch,” he wrote, “by requiring the board of 
education to treat unmarried heterosexual couples as well as it treats 
married ones, so that marriage will lose some of its luster.”77 
These days no one would accuse Lambda or any other national LGBT 
rights organization of wanting to “knock marriage off its perch” or cause it 
to “lose some of its luster.”  And therein likely lies the core of the decision 
by Lambda to abandon the unmarried heterosexual couples in Arizona as 
well as the decision by HRC to approve of employers that require that 
 
HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/domestic-partner-benefits-cost-
and-utilization (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
 73. EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., supra note 34, at 401.  It is typical for plan cost to 
increase 0.25 percent when adding same-sex domestic partners and 0.50 percent to 1 percent 
if both same-sex and different-sex partners are covered. James Campbell et al., Health Care 




 74. Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 32. 
 75. See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text. 
 76. Irizarry, 251 F.3d at 608–09. 
 77. Id. at 609. 
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heterosexuals marry to protect the health and economic welfare of their 
families.  Having argued forcefully for nothing less than marriage equality 
based precisely on marriage’s “luster” and “high perch,” neither Lambda 
nor HRC wishes to risk the equivalent of Posner’s tongue-lashing, 
especially in the political sphere, where unmarried women who have 
children appear to have even less support than gay and lesbian families.78 
The State in Diaz predictably argued that it had a legitimate interest in 
promoting marriage.79  To this the plaintiffs replied that there is no rational 
relationship between eliminating benefits for same-sex domestic partners 
and promoting marriage, because same-sex couples cannot marry and a 
benefit scheme only for married couples will not serve as an incentive for a 
gay employee to marry someone of a different sex.80  This argument, of 
course, does not work for unmarried heterosexual couples. 
Instead of more fully taking on this proffered justification, the rhetoric 
and language of Lambda’s pleadings and oral argument dismissed the 
heterosexuals who would not marry in the face of the new Arizona statute 
every bit as forcefully as Judge Posner dismissed Milagros Irizarry. 
Lambda successfully rebutted, in both the district court and the Ninth 
Circuit, Arizona’s marriage promotion rationale.  But it succeeded at a steep 
price.  The district court held that promoting marriage was a legitimate state 
interest.81  Because it only represented couples who said they would marry 
were it recognized in Arizona, Lambda threw its lot in with a “marriage 
promotion” rationale as long as same-sex couples can marry.  This is the 
polar opposite of arguing, as Lambda did in Irizarry, that “[n]o one’s family 
health and security should depend on their constitutionally protected choice 
of whether to marry or not.”82 
C.  Another Path Not Taken:  Advocating Family Diversity in 
Braschi v. Stahl Associates 
Lambda’s position in Irizarry was not an anomaly.  For example, it was 
fully consistent with that asserted by parties and amici, including Lambda, 
in the iconic 1989 case from the New York Court of Appeals, Braschi v. 
Stahl Associates.83 
Miguel Braschi and Leslie Blanchard lived together for eleven years in a 
New York City rent-controlled apartment whose lease was in Blanchard’s 
name.84  When Blanchard died of AIDS, the landlord sought to evict 
 
 78. PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW FAMILIES 62 
(Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pew-social-
trends-2010-families.pdf (69 percent of respondents surveyed believe that single women 
having children is a “bad thing;” 43 percent say that about gay and lesbian couples having 
children). 
 79. See Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 80. Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 41, at 40–41. 
 81. Collins v. Brewer, 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 806–07 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
 82. See Brief of Lambda Legal, supra note 63, at 12. 
 83. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). 
 84. See id. at 50–51. 
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Braschi.85  Braschi had a right to remain in the apartment only if he was a 
member of the deceased tenant’s family.86 
On Braschi’s behalf, the ACLU Lesbian and Gay Rights Project argued 
that family member should be defined in a functional way and should 
include a long-term same-sex couple.87  The landlord argued that family 
should be restricted to those with ties of blood, marriage, or adoption.88  
Over a dozen amici joined in several briefs supporting Braschi’s call for a 
functional definition of family.89  They presented staggering data on the 
number of households that would be affected by the court’s decision.  They 
stressed the impact on the poor, people of color, senior citizens, immigrants, 
people with AIDS, people with disabilities, foster families, stepfamilies, 
and tens of thousands of same-sex and unmarried different-sex couples.90 
Braschi prevailed when the Court of Appeals ruled that “protection 
against sudden eviction should not rest on fictitious legal distinctions or 
genetic history, but instead should find its foundation in the reality of 
family life.”91  Because the court ruled for Braschi on statutory grounds, it 
did not address his constitutional arguments, but the ACLU had made an 
equal protection claim, invoking two Supreme Court cases, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno92 and New Jersey Welfare Rights 
Organization v. Cahill,93 for the principle that “the United States 
Constitution forbids discrimination between different types of families and 
living arrangements when such distinctions are not related to the purpose of 
the government program at issue.”94  Moreno found unconstitutional the 
denial of food stamps to households containing unrelated individuals, a 
restriction Congress had enacted because it did not want assistance going to 
hippie communes.95  Cahill struck down a New Jersey scheme providing 
benefits to couples with children only when the couple was married.96 
No one argued that Braschi’s threatened eviction was either unwise or 
unconstitutional because he had been prohibited from marrying Blanchard.  
Such a contention would have been out of step with the interests of the 
many constituencies represented by the amici.  It also would have been out 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 52 (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2204.6 (1989)). 
 87. See generally Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49 
(N.Y. 1989) (No. 02194-87). 
 88. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 52–53. 
 89. The New York Reporter helpfully summarizes the points of counsel. See Braschi v. 
Stahl Assocs., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 202–05 (1989) (summarizing the arguments made in the amici 
briefs). 
 90. For a more detailed description of the arguments of several amici, see Nancy D. 
Polikoff, Equality and Justice for Lesbian and Gay Families and Relationships, 61 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 529, 533–35 (2009). 
 91. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 53–54. 
 92. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 93. 411 U.S. 619 (1973). 
 94. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 87, at 48. 
 95. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 537–38. 
 96. Cahill, 411 U.S. at 620–21. 
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of step with the constitutional protection afforded the Cahills, who could 
have obtained assistance from the state of New Jersey had they just married, 
or, for that matter, free-loving heterosexual hippies, who also had the option 
to marry.  While the subject in Diaz differed from that in Braschi, Diaz did 
have the potential to involve multiple constituencies, a potential Lambda 
squandered with its narrower framing and dismissive tone.97 
Although the outcome in Braschi was met with widespread acclaim by 
gay rights advocates, there was a lone dissenter.  Andrew Sullivan argued 
that Braschi was wrongly decided and that domestic partnerships should not 
exist.98  The answer, he asserted, was marriage for same-sex couples, and a 
bright line between those who marry—gay and straight—and those who 
don’t.  Sullivan’s 1989 article, subtitled A (Conservative) Case for Gay 
Marriage reads today as just that and is no longer an outlier position.99 
III.  RELUCTANCE TO CHAMPION THE RIGHTS OF UNMARRIED COUPLES 
WHEN MARRIAGE IS AVAILABLE:  A SHIFT IN THE APPROACH OF 
LGBT RIGHTS GROUPS 
I do not claim that Lambda Legal as an organization or any of its 
individual lawyers subscribe to Sullivan’s point of view.  Rather, I assess 
Lambda and other gay rights groups by the arguments they make and the 
cases and positions they do and do not take.  In this section, I examine a 
case that could be described as “Irizarry redux” in which all the LGBT 
legal organizations remained silent; a case squarely about marital status 
discrimination that Lambda framed publicly as a case about denial of access 
to marriage; and a disturbing reworking of the argument for maintaining 
domestic partner benefits after same-sex couples can marry. 
 
 97. In contrast to the numerous amici in Braschi, the only amicus brief in support of the 
plaintiffs in Diaz was filed on behalf of two Arizona gay rights organizations. See Brief of 
Amici Curiae Wingspan and One Voice Community Center Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees 
and Affirmance of the District Court Decision, Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 
2011) (No. 10-16797). 
 98. Andrew Sullivan, Here Comes The Groom: A (Conservative) Case for Gay 
Marriage, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 28, 1989, 1:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/article/79054/
here-comes-the-groom.   
 99. See id.  For a more contemporary articulation of the conservative case for same-sex 
marriage, consider the explanation offered by Theodore Olson, former Solicitor General 
under President George W. Bush, for his role as co-counsel in the challenge to California’s 
ban on same-sex marriage.  In 2010, in an article of the same name as the subtitle of 
Sullivan’s 1989 piece, Olson wrote that: 
Many of my fellow conservatives have an almost knee-jerk hostility toward gay 
marriage.  This does not make sense, because same-sex unions promote the values 
conservatives prize. . . .  The fact that individuals who happen to be gay want to 
share in this vital social institution is evidence that conservative ideals enjoy 
widespread acceptance.  Conservatives should celebrate this, rather than lament it. 
Theodore B. Olson, The Conservative Case for Gay Marriage, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 8. 2010, 
7:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/01/08/the-conservative-case-for-
gay-marriage.html. 
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A.  Silence in the Face of “Irizarry Redux” 
Six years after the Chicago Board of Education extended domestic 
partner benefits to employees with same-sex partners, the Health Benefits 
Consortium serving employees of school districts within New York’s 
Putnam Northern Westchester Board of Cooperative Educational Services 
(PNW BOCES) also extended benefits to the same-sex domestic partners of 
employees.100  In a lawsuit reminiscent of Irizarry, Kathe McBride, a 
teacher in the Croton-Harmon School District for over thirty years, filed a 
complaint with the Westchester Human Rights Commission (WHRC).101  
The Westchester Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of marital status and sexual orientation, and McBride alleged such 
discrimination when the plan denied her coverage for the man she had lived 
with for thirty-six years.102 
Discrimination in compensation or terms of employment because of an 
employee’s group identity is one of the unlawful practices under the law.103  
The Westchester County Human Rights Law also contains numerous 
legislative findings.  “In the County of Westchester, with its diverse 
population,” it begins: 
there is no greater danger to the health, morals, safety, and welfare of the 
County than the existence of prejudice, intolerance, and antagonism 
among  its residents because of their actual or perceived differences, 
including those based on race, color, religion, ethnicity, creed, age, 
national origin, alienage or citizenship status, familial status, gender, 
marital status, sexual orientation or disability.104 
It continues that the County has the duty “to act to assure that every 
individual . . . is afforded an equal, fair and timely opportunity to enjoy a 
full and productive life,” and that the law’s purpose is to ensure that 
“individuals who live in our free society have the capacity to make their 
own choices, follow their own beliefs and conduct their own lives with 
existing law.”105  McBride argued explicitly that penalizing her for 
choosing not to marry was inconsistent with that purpose.106 
The WHRC held a hearing on McBride’s claim on three dates in 2007 
and 2008.  The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of McBride 
on both grounds.107  He found sexual orientation discrimination because she 
would have received benefits had she been in a same-sex partnership, and 
 
 100. Putnam/N. Westchester Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs. v. Westchester Cnty. Human 
Rights Comm’n, 917 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (App. Div. 2011). 
 101. See id. 
 102. McBride and Carroll met all the other eligibility requirements for coverage. See 
Brief for Respondents at 6–7, PNW BOCES, 917 N.Y.S.2d 635 (No. 2009-08960). 
 103. WESTCHESTER COUNTY, N.Y. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW § 700.03(a)(1) (2009). 
 104. Id. § 700.01. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Reply Brief of Appellant Kathe McBride at 6, PNW BOCES, 917 N.Y.S.2d 635 (No. 
2009-08960). 
 107. Brief for Respondent-Appellant Westchester County Human Rights Commission at 
12, PNW BOCES, 917 N.Y.S.2d 635 (No. 2009-08960). 
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marital status discrimination because the denial of benefits was the result of 
her choice not to marry.108  The WHRC accepted and approved the ALJ’s 
findings.109 
PNW BOCES raised cost as a justification for its policy.  One of its 
witnesses was David Stern, the risk manager who had researched the costs 
of offering domestic partner coverage.110  The report he prepared estimated 
that extending benefits to both same-sex and different-sex domestic partners 
would result in ten to twenty additional enrollments per 1,000 employees, 
costing between $63,600 and $190,800 per 1,000 enrollees.111  Stern also 
estimated the cost would be half that amount if the benefit were extended 
only to same-sex partners.112  At the hearing, Stern testified that his further 
research suggested that there would be two to three times as many 
additional enrollees if different-sex partners were included.113 
Thomas Higgins, a member of the board that voted on the domestic 
partnership benefits policy, also testified.114  At that time there were twelve 
same-sex domestic partners receiving benefits.115  He testified that the 
board discussed extending coverage to different-sex partners and rejected it 
both because those partners could get married, and because the board 
wanted to contain costs.116  In ruling for McBride, the Commission found 
those reasons insufficient to justify the discrimination.117 
Pursuant to the procedure for appealing decisions of the Human Rights 
Commission, PNW BOCES sought review in the New York Appellate 
Division.  That court annulled the determination of the HRC.118  The court 
held that there was no marital status discrimination because the individuals 
treated differently from McBride had the same marital status as she.119  The 
court did agree that McBride had presented a prima facie case of sexual 
orientation discrimination, but it found that the fact that same-sex partners 
could not marry in New York was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for 
granting the benefits only to those partners.120  The court did not base its 
ruling on the alleged cost of covering different-sex couples. 
The New York Court of Appeals accepted review of the case and 
McBride, the WHRC, and PNW BOCES all filed briefs.  Among other 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 13. 
 110. See id. at 10–11. 
 111. Brief for Respondents, supra note 102, at 9.  In 2004, the plan covered 7,730 
enrollees. Id. at 9 n.2. 
 112. Id. at 10. 
 113. Brief for Respondent-Appellant Westchester County Human Rights Commission, 
supra note 107, at 11. 
 114. Id. at 10. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. at 12–13. 
 118. Putnam/N. Westchester Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs. v. Westchester Cnty. Human 
Rights Comm’n, 917 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (App. Div. 2011). 
 119. Id. at 639. 
 120. Id. 
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things, McBride argued that even if three times as many different-sex as 
same-sex partners were covered by the plan, as Stern had testified was 
likely, there would have been no, or only a slight, cost increase.121 
This litigation presented an opportunity for Lambda Legal and other 
LGBT rights groups to assert an argument similar to the one they presented 
in Irizarry, this time in the context of a statutory claim of marital status and 
sexual orientation discrimination.  McBride made no constitutional claims, 
and there was no need for amici to do so.  They could instead have argued 
for a robust interpretation of a local law that, unlike federal law or the 
federal Constitution, places sexual orientation and marital status 
discrimination on an equal footing with race, sex, and other protected 
categories.  But no amicus briefs were filed in the case. 
The parties in the McBride case settled on the eve of oral argument in 
February 2012.122  This may be because, effective July 24, 2011, the day 
same-sex couples obtained the right to marry in New York, PNW BOCES 
eliminated its domestic partner benefits.123  This deprived McBride of her 
argument for equal access to those benefits.  Same-sex couples in the PNW 
BOCES plan who do not marry are now in a situation identical to that of 
Kathe McBride.  The prediction articulated in Lambda’s Irizarry brief that 
one day gay employees would be forced to marry if they wanted to provide 
their partners with adequate access to health care has come true.124 
B.  DeWolf v. Countrywide:  Framing a Case Against Marital Status 
Discrimination As If It Were About the Harm of 
Denying Access to Marriage 
In the dozen years that span Irizarry, Diaz, and McBride, the focus of gay 
rights advocacy has been obtaining access to marriage.  This focus can even 
skew how a litigation group frames cases that offer protection for a wider 
range of family forms.  Consider one case in which Lambda represented a 
same-sex couple explicitly seeking protection as an unmarried couple, but 
in which it nonetheless made the public face of the case about lack of access 
to marriage. 
 
 121. Although the Appellate Division did not base its ruling on the cost of covering 
different-sex partners, PNW BOCES pursued that argument in the Court of Appeals, 
prompting further attention to it by McBride. Brief of Appellant Kathe McBride at 23–24, 
PNW BOCES, 917 N.Y.S.2d 635 (No. 2009-08960); Brief for Respondents, supra note 102, 
at 30, 34.  
 122. Arthur S. Leonard, A Near Miss? Domestic Partnership Benefits in the Age of 
Marriage Equality, LEONARD LINK (Feb. 10, 2012), http://newyorklawschool.
typepad.com/leonardlink/2012/02/a-near-miss-domestic-partnership-benefits-in-the-age-of-
marriage-equality.html. 
 123. Brief for Respondents, supra note 102, at 11 n.3. 
 124. Of course there are numerous other examples going back more than a decade.  See 
Tara Siegel Bernard, Some Companies Want Gays to Wed to Get Health Benefits, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 9, 2011, at B1.  Indeed, after Vermont enacted civil unions in 2000, the 
University of Vermont ended domestic partner benefits and required gay and lesbian 
employees to enter civil unions to retain health insurance for their partners.  Nancy Remsen, 
UVM Benefits Require Civil Union, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Sept. 28, 2000, at 1. 
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Adola DeWolf and Laura Watts decided to live together in the home that 
DeWolf owned.125  They wanted to share responsibility for the home and to 
protect the right of each in the event of the death or illness of the other.  The 
couple contacted the mortgage holder, Countrywide, for guidance, and the 
lender sent instructions to DeWolf for adding another name to the mortgage 
and note.126  Following those instructions, DeWolf executed a quitclaim 
deed transferring title to herself and Watts as joint tenants with right of 
survivorship.127 
When the couple submitted a copy of the recorded deed and other 
requested materials to Countrywide, the lender sent DeWolf a letter 
requiring payment in full of the mortgage and threatening foreclosure on the 
ground that she had violated a portion of the loan agreement prohibiting 
transfer of a right in the property without prior written permission.128  
When DeWolf called to discuss the content of the letter, Countrywide stated 
that it did not recognize domestic partnerships, although it would have 
allowed DeWolf to add the name of a spouse.129 
The couple refinanced the home with a different lender at a higher 
interest rate, and Lambda brought an action on their behalf against 
Countrywide alleging a violation of the federal Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act (ECOA), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of marital 
status.130  The complaint alleged that “[Countrywide’s] actions and policy 
of treating married couples differently from unmarried couples constitutes 
an ongoing violation of [the ECOA].”131  The complaint also alleged state 
tort and contract claims.132 
In spite of the actual legal claim in the case, Lambda announced the 
lawsuit with a press release containing the following heading:  “If these two 
women had been able to marry in New York, this would never have 
happened.”133  The press release further quoted Lambda Legal’s Marriage 
Project Director, David Buckel, saying, “Everyone from kids to creditors 
knows what it means when two people say they are married.”134  In 
describing the potential impact of this case, the Lambda website stated that 
“[a] victory in this case would help remind home loan lenders throughout 
 
 125. Information about this case comes from the Lambda Legal website. See DeWolf & 
Watts v. Countrywide, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/dewolf-
and-watts-v-countrywide (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
 126. See id. 
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 128. Id. 
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 131. Complaint at 9, DeWolf v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 2:07-cv-04072-SAS 
(S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2007). 
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the country that they must treat unmarried same-sex couples as they do 
married different-sex couples.”135 
In other words, a case that Lambda could have championed for the 
imperative of respecting family heterogeneity, in the manner of Braschi, 
was instead proclaimed another example of the harm of denying same-sex 
couples access to marriage.  Lambda made this choice in spite of the fact 
that the legal basis for the claim was a federal statute prohibiting marital 
status discrimination.136 
The lawsuit settled after discussions with Fannie Mae prompted that 
organization to revise its policies to permit a homeowner to add the name of 
another person who will live in the home, related or not, to a title and 
mortgage.137  In the press release announcing the settlement, Lambda 
Senior Staff Attorney Thomas Ude stated, “We applaud the nation’s largest 
mortgage-buyer for reviewing its policies and updating them so that 
homeowners can tell lenders ‘we are a family,’ and know that their family 
will be respected.”138  Plaintiff Adola DeWolf is quoted as saying that 
“Fannie Mae’s new policies ensure that other couples, whether married or 
not, will be able to share home ownership without risking the loss of the 
very home they share.”139 
In the end, therefore, the settlement of the case tracked the legal theory in 
the complaint and even improved upon it.  Unmarried couples, gay and 
straight, may become joint owners without risking loss of the existing 
mortgage.  And the additional individual need not be a romantic partner; the 
original homeowner may make any arrangement she wishes to fully share 
her home with another person, and that choice will be respected by the 
mortgage holder as fully as the choice to marry. 
The case stands, then, as a triumph for the principles I support.  My 
quarrel is with the way Lambda framed the case for public consumption, as 
an example of the harm of denying access to marriage rather than the harm 
of discriminating against families other than married couples.  In Diaz, that 
very same perspective allowed Lambda to inaccurately characterize the 
State’s decision to end all domestic partner benefits as one in which only 
gay employees lost benefits, and to thereby exclude unmarried different-sex 
partners from its advocacy. 
C.  GLAD Narrows the Reasons to Support Domestic Partnership Benefits 
Gay rights groups have weighed in against terminating domestic partner 
benefits once same-sex couples achieve marriage equality.  But their 
arguments have changed over time in telling ways.  In May 2004, the first 
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same-sex couples began marrying in Massachusetts as a result of successful 
litigation by Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD) in 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.140  A month later, all the 
leading gay rights legal and advocacy groups, including GLAD, Lambda, 
and HRC, issued a joint statement on the importance of retaining domestic 
partner benefits, even after marriage equality.141 
The statement offered six reasons why employers should not eliminate 
domestic partner benefits.142  The number one reason stressed the original 
purpose of such benefits:  recognizing family diversity.143  The statement 
also unequivocally recommended that “employers who are among the small 
minority offering domestic partner benefits only to same-sex partners 
consider expanding their policies to be inclusive, the approach which is 
becoming standard business practice, rather than eliminating domestic 
partner benefits entirely.”144  The statement further articulated the low cost 
of the benefits and the advantages to be gained in recruiting and retaining 
employees.145  Under the reason entitled, “Employers should provide equal 
pay for equal work,” the statement asserted that: 
 There is no logical reason why civil marriage should be the dividing 
line between which employees’ families are eligible for benefits, and 
which . . . are not.  If an employer recognizes the value of supporting 
employees’ families, demonstrations of caregiving and emotional and 
financial interdependence . . . are a more accurate way to define who is 
‘family’ than marriage licenses.146 
The statement also offered two final reasons grounded in the uncertainty 
of marriage equality:  the refusal of many states to recognize same-sex 
marriage and the possibility of a future constitutional amendment barring 
it.147 
Lambda Legal’s unsympathetic posture towards the unmarried different-
sex couples in Arizona is inconsistent with the reasoning of this 2004 
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statement.  A more recent statement by GLAD, in December 2011, reveals 
a shift consistent with Lambda’s decision as well as the criteria HRC uses 
in its Corporate Equality Index.148  While GLAD still asks employers to 
maintain domestic partner benefits, it no longer endorses family diversity, 
an end to marital status discrimination, expansion of benefits to unmarried 
different-sex couples, or the wisdom of basing benefits on functional family 
ties.149 
Instead, GLAD relies on the vulnerabilities of same-sex couples who 
marry.150  Not marrying is the right choice for some same-sex couples, the 
2011 statement asserts, but only because of the tangible difficulties caused 
by uneven laws and lack of federal recognition.151  These include 
restrictions on international adoption by married same-sex couples; fear of 
exposing an undocumented spouse to immigration officials resulting in 
deportation; concern that marriage amounts to outing the two individuals 
and that they might face employment discrimination if they later move to a 
state that does not forbid such discrimination; understandable reluctance of 
couples to embrace the uncertain legal status caused by federal 
nonrecognition of same-sex marriages; and the possible problems with 
portability of insurance based on same-sex marriage.152 
The final take-away in the GLAD statement is as follows:  “Until there is 
more respect for marriages of same-sex couples as marriages, employers 
need to understand that marriage can be risky business for same-sex 
couples.  Forcing same-sex couples to marry for health insurance may have 
unintended negative consequences.”153  Entirely absent from this statement 
is respect for family diversity, including the decision of both gay and 
straight couples not to marry.  This is a far cry from the final sentence of the 
2004 Joint Statement:  “We hope employers . . . will understand that 
marriage and domestic partnership can and will continue to exist side by 
side, two parts of the landscape of family in America.”154 
CONCLUSION 
I have yet to find an unequivocal contemporary statement by a major 
LGBT rights legal or political organization that no one—same-sex couples 
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included—should have to marry to provide for the economic and emotional 
security of his or her partner. 
This should change.  An affirmative public position that all unmarried 
partners should be eligible for domestic partner benefits is neither fringe, 
utopian, or unattainable.  Fortunately, there are many employers whose 
policies gay rights groups could hold up as examples.  I offer one inspiring 
example from my own employer, American University. 
When originally instituted, American University limited coverage to 
same-sex partners.  In the late 2000s, one newly hired member of my law 
faculty reluctantly married her long-time male partner because it was the 
only way he would have health insurance. 
In 2010, the District of Columbia extended the ability to marry to same-
sex couples.155  D.C. also retained the status of registered domestic 
partnership, which has never been restricted to same-sex couples.156  These 
circumstances prompted a reassessment of the university’s domestic 
partnership coverage and resulted in an expansion of eligibility.  Same-sex 
and different-sex couples are eligible immediately if they marry or register.  
Two people who do not formalize their status in either fashion can still 
qualify for coverage if they have lived together for at least twelve months, 
intend to live together indefinitely, and satisfy a set of criteria 
demonstrating financial interdependence.157 
Other examples of admirable policies can be found among private and 
public employers who, often to avoid explicitly favoring same-sex and/or 
unmarried couples, have instituted “plus one” policies.158  Typically, such 
policies allow the employee to include another adult living with the 
employee if the two individuals can show financial interdependence.159  
The children of the other adult are also often eligible for coverage.  Even 
though these policies eschew a “gay rights” rationale, the results can be 
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terrific for encompassing the diverse forms of gay and straight family 
arrangements. 
Just as the change in mortgage modification policies that resulted from 
DeWolf validates a household created by two people who are not in an 
intimate, sexual relationship, so “plus one” employee benefit schemes 
recognize family structures beyond the conjugal norm.  A gay man and a 
lesbian, for example, may raise a child together in one home.  Two 
unpartnered mothers, gay or straight, may commit to pooling their 
economic and caregiving resources to raise the children of both in a 
common household.  “Plus one” benefits mean that, in such instances, one 
adult can protect the health and resulting economic well-being of the entire 
household. 
Gay rights groups should develop model policies for extending employee 
health benefits beyond spouses, post them prominently on their websites, 
and advocate for them as forcefully as they advocate for access to marriage.  
The HRC should factor the existence of more comprehensive policies into 
its Corporate Equality Index. 
Legal groups, including Lambda, should never trivialize or disrespect the 
choice not to marry as they have in Diaz.  They should also be vigilant for 
opportunities to expand legal doctrine to protect the economic and 
emotional wellbeing of those, gay or straight, who make that choice.  This 
includes further developing the reasoning of Moreno and Cahill that 
animated Miguel Braschi’s lawyers and the marital status discrimination 
arguments highlighted by Kathe McBride.  When they take such cases, as 
they did with DeWolf, the legal groups should frame the issue publicly as 
furthering the principle that discrimination against unmarried couples is 
wrong. 
Requiring a couple to marry, or say they would, deprives those who do 
not want to marry, gay and straight, of a path to benefits.  A demand for 
formal equality that is framed as give-a-same-sex-couple-who-cannot-
marry-exactly-what-you-give-a-married-different-sex-couple, is a cramped 
vision of family that distances the gay rights movement from much of its 
earlier advocacy and much of its constituency.160 
In signing the 2004 statement on retaining domestic partnerships, 
Lambda and the other gay rights groups included families created outside of 
marriage—even when marriage is available—within their ambit.  Diaz, 
HRC’s Corporate Equality Index criteria, and GLAD’s 2011 statement on 
retaining domestic partnership portend a different direction, one which 
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divides the LGBT community into those who do or would marry and those 
who do not or would not marry, with the needs of the former group alone 
falling in the domain of “gay rights.” 
Elsewhere, I have speculated about what will happen the next time a 
surviving member of a same-sex couple faces eviction in a state that offers 
marriage or a marriage-equivalent status.161  If the couple did not marry, I 
fear a gay rights litigation group will not represent the survivor, and that a 
gay rights advocacy group will remain silent.  I consider such a possibility 
tragic. 
An increasing number of same-sex couples will have the ability to marry 
but will choose not to.  Winning political campaigns or lawsuits at their 
expense should be considered an example of “winning backward,” a 
circumstance I define as “a victory whose legal basis sets back a goal 
greater than the immediate outcome.”162  Before the Village Voice, before 
Braschi, before Arizona’s 2008 extension of employee benefits, marriage 
was the bright line dividing relationships that mattered from those that were 
expendable.  Marriage equality for same-sex couples does not justify a 
return to those days. 
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